A leading German daily newspaper is now calling for the country to “pull out of the Two Plus Four Treaty”, clearing the way for Germany’s nuclear armament. A recent editorial in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) argues that “German military preparedness” requires nuclear warheads as part of the ramping up of the military, but notes the obstacle of treaty obligations. Berlin is prohibited not only from procuring nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons but also from increasing the number of Bundeswehr personnel beyond 370,000. The push in some quarters for Germany to become a nuclear power comes as experts confirm that, technologically, Germany is certainly capable of building nuclear bombs and setting up nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. The only problem in terms of logistics is, according to the FAZ opinion piece, finding a location to conduct the unavoidable nuclear tests for an independent nuclear weapons programme. Politically and legally, this move would also demand Germany’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This could have far-reaching global consequences. For one thing it would only encourage a number of countries already considering nuclear weapons to take the leap: not only Iran and Saudi Arabia but also South Korea and Poland. Surveys indicate that public approval for a German atom bomb is growing, but more people are still against it. Bundeswehr experts identify longstanding “moral reflexes” behind public reservations – reflexes which, they say, must be overcome.
Technologically feasible
Although Germany has phased-out nuclear power plants, experts believe that the technological capabilities for producing its own nuclear weapons could be mobilised within a fairly short period of time. All the experts agree that the technology and know-how required for uranium enrichment already exists at the Jülich and Gronau research centres. The next step would probably be to construct a significantly larger uranium enrichment plant. However, such a project would easily produce “the quantity required for several nuclear warheads in three to five years,” according to reports citing Rainer Moormann, a chemist and former employee of the Jülich Research Centre.[1] Problems could well arise in connection with the tests that would have to be carried out. An underground test in Europe is simply not feasible, so it is uncertain just where Germany could go. Another aspect concerns the missiles needed to deliver the nuclear weapons to their target. Germany is in a relatively poor position when it comes to building its own long-range ballistic missiles. However, the option of producing cruise missiles fitted with nuclear weapons appears, notes the FAZ editorial, quite feasible. The Taurus missile, for example, could be a starting point. It would then be deployment-ready within no more than five years.[2]
Legally possible, politically risky
The legal and political situation is more difficult. On the one hand, the Federal Republic of Germany ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on 2 May 1975, albeit after a considerable delay (german-foreign-policy.com reported [3]). If today’s German government wanted to start building its own nuclear weapons, it would first have to abrogate the agreement. This step would be legally possible without further ado, but it would have serious political consequences. Other countries seeking to get their own hands on nuclear bombs would feel empowered to do the same as Germany. Iran has, for decades, been considered one of the most likely candidates for joining the ranks of the world’s nuclear powers. Saudi Arabia, Iran’s fiercest regional rival in the past, has now also signalled its nuclear ambitions. South Korea is also considering the construction of nuclear weapons. Seoul says that such considerations, which met with strong international criticism last year, are “not off the table” in view of apparent US unreliability under the Trump administration.[4] Consideration of nuclear options are now being voiced even in other European countries. Poland’s Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, recently announced that Warsaw would not rule out the acquisition of nuclear weapons.[5]
The Two Plus Four Treaty
What also stands in the way of Germany’s path to nuclear armament is the Two Plus Four Treaty, under which the Federal Republic of Germany confirmed its renunciation of NBC weapons and also agreed to limiting the size of its armed forces to an upper limit of 370,000 Bundeswehr soldiers. The treaty cannot be easily terminated. Any changes would require the consent of all of the Four Powers, which had occupied Germany after the Second World War. The German diplomat Ernst-Jörg von Studnitz, a former ambassador to Russia, recently expressed the view that there was a way out: by invoking the principle under international law of ‘clausula rebus sic stantibus’, according to which treaty provisions “can be terminated if the fundamental conditions under which a treaty was concluded have changed.”[6] This could, he said, be argued from the German perspective, since the American nuclear umbrella could no longer be considered reliable and the conflict with Russia had escalated. Yesterday, Monday, the FAZ adopted the core of this argument in a widely read editorial. There are “good reasons,” it says, “to speak of a loss of the foundations for the Two Plus Four Treaty.” It concludes that “a contractual commitment that harms the country or only serves an adversary and former treaty partner could not, of course, endure.”[7] As the FAZ editorial heading says, Germany must “unfasten old shackles”.
Potential for immense turmoil
The political upheaval that results from scrapping the Two Plus Four Treaty would be potentially immense. German nuclear armament would spark strong reactions from the four former world war allies that are treaty signatories, albeit for different reasons in each case. Moreover, the Two Plus Four Treaty also contains important provisions regulating German territory and German borders. If Berlin declares that it no longer wishes to abide by the treaty, an important pillar of the post-war order in Europe will have fallen.
Growing public approval
Not only abroad but also at home would the proponents of German nuclear weapons face some difficult hurdles. A clear majority of the population is still against such a plan. However, there are considerable variations in the survey data, depending on which research institute is quoted. The trend is certainly one of a declining aversion to a German bomb. A Forsa survey, for instance, conducted around two and a half weeks ago showed that 64 per cent of the population were against Germany having nuclear weapons. Only 31 per cent were in favour. However, the “yes” camp was already four percentage points higher than in 2024.[8] A survey conducted by the opinion research institute Civey over the same time period came to the conclusion that only 48 per cent of the population clearly rejected a German bomb. A year earlier, that figure had been 57 per cent. The proportion of those in favour of acquiring German nuclear weapons rose to 38 per cent.[9] Interestingly, both surveys also show that the proportion of Germans in favour of nuclear armament in their country is considerably higher in West Germany, i.e. the old FRG, than in the east – the territory of the former GDR.
‘Moral reflexes’
In view of insufficient, if fast growing, public support for nuclear armament, two employees of the Helmut Schmidt University of the Federal Armed Forces in Hamburg wrote a piece, published again in the FAZ, arguing for efforts to counter society’s reluctance and passivity on the question of nuclear deterrence. The article, published on Monday, complains that the German debate on nuclear weapons is “still characterised by moral reflexes and traditional narratives handed down from the past.”[10] In contrast, “a sober reassessment” of the “subject” must be undertaken, they say. For instance, it is important to “maintain state functions” even “after a nuclear strike”. To keep the country running, the current debate must be widened to embrace “the important aspects of civil defence and social resilience”. The German population must “learn to live with the bomb”, and this demands “a comprehensive, socially and politically embedded strategy that integrates the relevant military, political and social dimensions”. In short, they say, “our own population must be convinced” of the necessity of nuclear armament and of accepting the consequences. This is a task that traditionally falls to the mainstream media.
[1], [2] Gernot Kramper: Eine deutsche Bombe? stern.de 09.03.2025.
[3] See also: Die „Atom-Supermacht Europa“.
[4] Richard Lloyd Parry: South Korea says nuclear weapons are ‘not off the table’. thetimes.com 02.03.2025. See also: Bloc Formation in East Asia (II).
[5] Reinhard Lauterbach: Polen will die Bombe. junge Welt 17.03.2025.
[6] Ernst-Jörg von Studnitz: Leserbrief: Der Weg für eine deutsche Nuklearoption. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 14.03.2025.
[7] Reinhard Müller: Deutschland muss alte Fesseln lösen. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 24.03.2025.
[8] Lorenz Wolf-Doettinchem: Sollte Deutschland zum Schutz vor Putin eigene Atombomben bauen? stern.de 11.03.2025.
[9] Umfrage zeigt Wende bei Zustimmung zu Atomwaffen. t-online.de 10.03.2025.
[10] Michael Jonas, Severin Pleyer: Die Bombe verstehen lernen. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 24.03.2025.
Prophetic Link:
“The Spirit of God is being grieved away from the earth. The nations are angry with one another. Widespread preparations are being made for war. The night is at hand. Let the church arouse and go forth to do her appointed work. Every believer, educated or uneducated, can bear the message.” Testimonies for the Church, Vol. 9, page 26
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William Stroud
Saturday April 5th, 2025 at 09:58 AMAs the quote from the Spirit of Prophecy says, we must go forth and spread the message while there is time.